The Keynesian model and the Austrian economic philosophy continue to lock horns. Similar ideas have gone toe to toe for three centuries now trying to explain the business cycle. Thomas Malthus and Jean-Baptiste Say made their case in the 19th century, John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek in the 20th century, and the largely Keynesian-dominated public policy of today against the increasingly louder Austrian rebuttal. Keynesians believe the cause of recession is a general glut of goods and insufficient demand for those goods. They tend to use John Mayard Keynes’ ideas as an excuse for government to spend, claiming that we can spend (borrow and print) our way out of recession and a lack of aggregate demand. This has been the thinking behind Bush and Obama’s policies to avoid depression and a double dip recession. Paul Krugman contends that the stimulus bill would have worked wonders had we only spent more, floating a $2 trillion figure. But then again, Krugman also advised Alan Greenspan in a 2002 Times editorial to offset the bursted stock market bubble with a housing bubble. Said Krugman:
To fight this recession the Fed needs…soaring household spending to offset moribund business investment. [So] Alan Greenspan needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble.
That is some killer advice. Thanks Paul. It is commentary like this that makes Krugman the least favorite economist of my colleague Andrew.
Meanwhile, Austrians like Peter Schiff and Ron Paul predicted the 2008 crash in remarkably specific terms. Many YouTube videos of Peter Schiff commenting on the state of the economy have gone viral. Who can forget Schiff absolutely eviscerating Art Laffer on CNBC? Andrew posted a collection of Schiff commentary here, including the Laffer segment. Ron Paul predicted the housing bubble and warned of the perverse involvement of Fannie and Freddie in the housing market as early as 2002 on the House floor:
Mr. Speaker, I rise to introduce the Free Housing Market Enhancement Act. This legislation restores a free market in housing by repealing special privileges for housing-related government sponsored enterprises (GSEs). These entities are the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie), and the National Home Loan Bank Board (HLBB). According to the Congressional Budget Office, the housing-related GSEs received $13.6 billion worth of indirect federal subsidies in fiscal year 2000 alone.
One of the major government privileges granted these GSEs is a line of credit to the United States Treasury. According to some estimates, the line of credit may be worth over $2 billion. This explicit promise by the Treasury to bail out these GSEs in times of economic difficulty helps them attract investors who are willing to settle for lower yields than they would demand in the absence of the subsidy. Thus, the line of credit distorts the allocation of capital. More importantly, the line of credit is a promise on behalf of the government to engage in a massive unconstitutional and immoral income transfer from working Americans to holders of GSE debt.
The Free Housing Market Enhancement Act also repeals the explicit grant of legal authority given to the Federal Reserve to purchase the debt of housing-related GSEs. GSEs are the only institutions besides the United States Treasury granted explicit statutory authority to monetize their debt through the Federal Reserve. This provision gives the GSEs a source of liquidity unavailable to their competitors.
Ironically, by transferring the risk of a widespread mortgage default, the government increases the likelihood of a painful crash in the housing market. This is because the special privileges of Fannie, Freddie, and HLBB have distorted the housing market by allowing them to attract capital they could not attract under pure market conditions. As a result, capital is diverted from its most productive use into housing. This reduces the efficacy of the entire market and thus reduces the standard of living of all Americans.
However, despite the long-term damage to the economy inflicted by the government’s interference in the housing market, the government’s policies of diverting capital to other uses creates a short-term boom in housing. Like all artificially-created bubbles, the boom in housing prices cannot last forever. When housing prices fall, homeowners will experience difficulty as their equity is wiped out. Furthermore, the holders of the mortgage debt will also have a loss. These losses will be greater than they would have otherwise been had government policy not actively encouraged over-investment in housing.
Perhaps the Federal Reserve can stave off the day of reckoning by purchasing GSE debt and pumping liquidity into the housing market, but this cannot hold off the inevitable drop in the housing market forever. In fact, postponing the necessary but painful market corrections will only deepen the inevitable fall. The more people invested in the market, the greater the effects across the economy when the bubble bursts.
No less an authority than Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has expressed concern that government subsidies provided to the GSEs make investors underestimate the risk of investing in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Mr. Speaker, it is time for Congress to act to remove taxpayer support from the housing GSEs before the bubble bursts and taxpayers are once again forced to bail out investors misled by foolish government interference in the market. I therefore hope my colleagues will stand up for American taxpayers and investors by cosponsoring the Free Housing Market Enhancement Act.
You know who else called the housing bubble and GSE nightmare? Henry Hazlitt, in 1946.
Then, of course, there is the fudging of history to support your viewpoint and confirm your bias. Keynesians like to point to New Deal policies saying that the government action propelled us out of the Great Depression. They also say that World War II got us out of the Depression, which is one of the most repugnant fallacies spewed today. Recently Krugman argued that fiscal austerity would make our economic crisis worse:
Even if we manage to avoid immediate catastrophe, the deals being struck on both sides of the Atlantic are almost guaranteed to make the broader economic slump worse…if the negotiations succeed, we will be set to replay the great mistake of 1937: the premature turn to fiscal contraction that derailed economic recovery …
Unfortunately, Paul doesn’t quite have his facts straight. Total government spending never decreased in the 1930s. Total government spending actually went up:
After seven years of New Deal spending, then-Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau said in 1939, “We have tried spending money. We have spent more than we have ever spent before and it does not work.” It is possible that things would have been worse without government spending. That generally unknowable counter-factual is a favorite argument of Keynesians. So does government spending help if the rest of the economy is deleveraging and deferring a portion of their consumption? Krugman’s platform, The New York Times, recently pointed out that many studies show fiscal cuts actually lead to greater economic growth; even during the short-term when Keynesian spending tries to limit the pain of a recession:
Recent studies, however, have found the opposite: Countries that rely primarily on spending cuts tend to experience less economic pain in the short term. Moreover, in some cases, the cuts seem to spur faster growth.
The monetary fund study reported that a 1 percent fiscal consolidation achieved primarily through tax increases reduced economic activity by 1.3 percent over two years, while an identical consolidation driven primarily by spending cuts reduced activity by 0.3 percent.
Austrians believe one’s productivity drives their purchasing power, and that only savings (deferred consumption) can be invested to produce real economic growth. As Peter Schiff says, paper wealth of stocks and real estate can be driven up by malinvestment caused by Federal Reserve and government policies. Naturally, that paper wealth eventually crashes back down to Earth after the bubble bursts. Inflating one bubble after another and driving capital to areas of the economy it doesn’t belong is not a coherent economic policy. In fact, the greater the malinvestment, the harder the fall. The more you prop up the malinvestment, the worse you make it. Debt-financed “growth” is not growth, particularly as it erodes the purchasing power of the dollar.
I’ll leave you with a debate between friends in a bar, or should I say pub as Keynes gets to host. Three of the most influential economists ever, whose ideas shape our monetary and government policy, decide who understands the business cycle best. Without further ado, Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and John Maynard Keynes walk into a pub, courtesy of Nick Hubble:
Friedman asks Hayek; ‘So what should be done then?’ Keynes chimes in; ‘Yeah, doing nothing would mean a terrible depression.’
Hayek sighs.
No. Doing nothing would have avoided the problem in the first place. You are right that over indebtedness causes a depression. People, businesses and governments all realise they cannot afford the debt. They invested the money in things that do not justify the cost of the debt by providing revenue that exceeds the debt. Now they have to liquidate that debt by paying it off or defaulting. And that causes the deflationary contagion that Fisher fears.
But why is there so much debt in the first place? And why was it so poorly invested? None of you seem to explain that. And don’t tell me it’s just a cycle. People make mistakes, but they only do it as a group at the same time when there is a reason for it – a cause.
Remembering that debt and money are synonymous in the monetary system we live in, it should become obvious. Who controls the price and quantity of money? The government and/or the central bank do. Along with the private banks that can create money out of thin air, as Fisher often laments.
Just as price controls, rationing and fraud wreak havoc in any industry they are employed in by government and monopolists, so they wreak havoc in the banking industry – the industry of money. And money is half of every transaction.
If government keeps interest rates too low and creates too much money, which is then multiplied by the banks, there is too much debt. Eventually this will lead to the over indebtedness that causes a depression. The money and debt vanishes because it was never real. It only existed as bookkeeping entries on the central banks and private banks balance sheets.
Profitable investments are financed by real savings – deferred consumption – not imaginary money created out of nothing. Entrepreneurs are fooled by this sleight of hand on the part of their bankers. They think they are investing real savings, with the consumption that was deferred becoming their demand in the future. But, as the savings weren’t real, the consumption wasn’t deferred and so never materialises. Thus, the malinvestments are exposed.
‘That may or may not be true, but you haven’t answered my question,’ Friedman points out. ‘Now that we are in debt, what should we do?’
Hayek smiles. ‘Buy gold.’
Photo Credit (Preview): KAZVorpal
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